"Fortunes are being made by taking the life savings off gullible people in return for getting them, illegally, into a country like Britain. The sales talk is doubtless about a land flowing with milk and honey, and streets paved with gold."
The Campaign for Political Ecology 1 "…for our relatives who live in the isle, in their small minds they think that money grow[s] out of trees, and thus expect people overseas to provide them with their need[s]…Tongans returning home for visits make the situation worse by exaggerating their success and wealth and creating unrealistic expectations"
Tongan online discussion group (quoted in Lee,2003, p. 36) Does migration make people better off? Revealed preference would suggest yes, as evidenced by the large number of people choosing to pursue life in a different land each year. However, as the above quotes illustrate, some critics contend that migrants may hold unrealistic expectations of the incomes they can earn abroad. Such expectations may be inflated by television and film images of life abroad (Mai, 2004) , and by returning migrants presenting an overly positive image of their lives overseas. Typical anecdotes tell of migrants working 14 hours a day and living six to a room returning for a three-day holiday at home, bringing consumer goods and spending a lot to show how successful they have become. As a result, it could be the case that many intending migrants overestimate the incomes they can earn abroad.
Whether or not emigrants are overly optimistic about incomes abroad is a question of key policy importance, given the large and growing migration pressures around the world. Zealand is reflected in the excess applications for an annual immigration quota. If this enormous pressure to emigrate reflects mistaken beliefs about the incomes that can be earned abroad, then migration may lead to disappointment and frustration for the migrant, resulting in social problems in the destination country. But it would also suggest that more accurate information on earnings abroad could help lower immigration pressures.
This paper uses unique survey data combined with a natural experiment in order to assess the accuracy of these concerns by determining whether potential emigrants have correct expectations about the incomes they would earn working abroad. We survey Tongans who applied to emigrate to New Zealand under the Pacific Access Category (PAC), which allows a quota of Tongans to immigrate each year, in addition to those approved through other categories. 2 Many more people apply than the quota allows, and so a lottery (referred to as a ballot) is used to determine who can emigrate through the Pacific Access Category. 3 We elicited expectations about employment and income in New Zealand from individuals in Tonga who had applied to emigrate but whose names were not chosen in the ballot. Expectations were elicited by adapting the probabilistic expectations questions used by Dominitz and Manski (1997) , Dominitz (1998) and Manski (2004) . These 2 The main other categories are family sponsored migration and a business/skilled category. In the 2004/05 financial year New Zealand admitted 58 Tongans through the business/skilled category and 549 through family sponsored channels. Most migrants under the family sponsored categories enter as parents, children, or spouses/domestic partners of existing New Zealand residents. 3 Individuals must also fulfill other eligibility requirements in order to migrate through the Pacific Access Category, including being aged 18 to 45, and meeting English, health and character requirements.
responses are then used to estimate the subjective distribution of earnings in New Zealand of ballot losers, which can be compared to the distribution of earnings realized by the ballot winners who emigrated.
In contrast to the concern that migrants could be over-optimistic, we find striking evidence that they underestimate both the odds of being employed, and the incomes that We show that expected earnings do predict whether or not individuals apply to migrate, and then explore several explanations for the underestimation of employment likelihoods and expected earnings. We find individuals to have lower expectations of employment in New Zealand if they live close to the houses of migrants who were unable to take up their initial job offers. This is consistent with the behavioral/psychological literature in which individuals place disproportionate emphasis on negative events (Taylor, 1991 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Pacific Access Category and the survey upon which this paper is based. Section 3 outlines in detail how expectations are measured. Sections 4 and 5 compare expectations about employment and income in New Zealand to the actual distributions experienced by migrants. Section 6 then explores several explanations for the difference between actual and expected work outcomes, and Section 7 concludes.
Description of the Survey and Experimental Design
The data used in this paper are from the Tongan component of the Pacific Island-New
Zealand Migration Survey (PINZMS), a comprehensive household survey designed to 7 measure multiple aspects of the migration process. The unique feature of PINZMS is that it is based on a natural experiment that enables the income gains from migration to be estimated free of any selection bias (McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 2006 Gibson and Stillman (2006) show that there is little selection among ballot winners, and so we focus on a comparison of migrants and ballot losers here. We use the sample of ballot winners still in Tonga in part of the paper, and also employ a sample of individuals who did not apply to the PAC, collected as part of the same survey.
While the survey obtains labor market information from all adults the detailed questions on expectations are directed only at the Principal Applicants. We have 65 Principal
Applicants in the immigrant sub-sample and 78 in the sample whose ballot application was unsuccessful. Table 1 reports selected characteristics for these two groups.
Measuring Expectations
We elicited probabilistic expectations about employment and income in New Zealand from the sample of PAC ballot losers in Tonga. We will compare these expectations to the realized employment and income outcomes of the ballot winners, who had emigrated to New Zealand. We also reversed the procedure by eliciting probabilistic expectations about employment and income in Tonga from the immigrants in New Zealand.
Survey Questions
We follow the approach pioneered by Dominitz and Manski (1997) the realized incomes of the migrant group. As will be seen, we observe the opposite.
All individuals who expressed a percent chance greater than zero of working for pay were then asked what they thought were the lowest weekly amount and highest weekly amount that they could possibly be earning in New Zealand if they were working for pay in New
Zealand right now. As Dominitz and Manski (1997) note, these questions serve to decrease overconfidence problems in which respondents tend to focus too much on central tendencies and not consider the uncertainty in potential outcomes. They also act to decrease anchoring problems whereby respondents' beliefs are influenced by the amounts that the interviewer asks about.
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The average of the answers to the highest and lowest weekly incomes were then used by the interviewer to read a set of threshold levels of income, Y1, Y2, Y3, and Y4, from a predetermined A more direct question with income would be to ask would-be emigrants how much they would expect to be paid if they were working in New Zealand. A variant of this is used in the New Immigrant Survey, which asks immigrants to state how much they think workers usually earn in various jobs in the United States. However, as Dominitz (1998) points out, it is not clear if individuals are reporting means, medians, modes, or some other quantiles of their subjective distributions when they respond to such questions. In contrast, by eliciting probabilities, we can estimate all quantiles and moments of interest from the subjective earnings distribution.
Fitting the Subjective Earnings Distribution
We summarize briefly here the procedure for estimating the subjective distribution of earnings conditional on working. We follow closely the approach of Dominitz and Manski (1997) , where further details are provided.
The four responses about percent chances for the income threshold questions are divided by 100 and then interpreted as points on the subjective cumulative distribution function (CDF) of weekly labor income if they were working in New Zealand. Thus for each individual i, we observe
where y i denotes earnings in New Zealand, Y i,1 , Y i,2 , Y i,3 and Y i,4 are the earnings thresholds that i is asked about, φ i is i's information set, and z=1 denotes that the expectations are conditional on working in New Zealand. Let G(Y; μ, σ 2 ) denote the CDF of a log-normal distribution, where log Y ~ N(μ, σ 2 ). For each respondent, we then find estimates μ i , σ i 2 to solve the least squares problem 8 :
Once a distribution has been fitted for each respondent, we can then obtain moments and quantiles of interest from the fitted distribution. We extract the mean, standard deviation, median and selected percentiles from the fitted distribution. The log-normal distribution fits the elicited points very closely. One measure of the goodness of fit is the mean absolute difference between the elicited and fitted distributions. This average difference is 0.017, and 73 out of the 77 observations have mean absolute errors below 0.05. These fits are closer than those achieved by Dominitz and Manski (1997) examples of less accurate fits (mean absolute differences of 0.043 and 0.032). However, even in these cases the fit is quite close, suggesting the log-normal distribution is an appropriate approximation to the subjective CDF. Table 2 explores this further by presenting the mean and quantiles of this distribution.
Expectations about Employment
The mean percent chance of being employed expected by potential emigrants is 57.2 percent. This is lower than both the 72.7 percent employment rate that they currently have in Tonga, and lower than the 75.4 percent employment rate of the PAC immigrants in New Zealand. When we break the data down by gender, we see that the underestimation seems to be coming only from males. Both males and females express an average percent chance of being employed in New Zealand of 57 percent, however amongst our sample of PAC ballot winners in New Zealand, males have an 88 percent employment rate and females a 52 percent rate. 9 The confidence interval for the male expected rate covers rates all less than the rates in the confidence interval for the mean actual rate. In contrast, although the sample of female immigrants is relatively small, making the confidence intervals wide, the point estimates are close for the average expected rate and actual rate.
Expectations about income in New Zealand

Earnings Conditional on Working
The first row of has positive mass between $800 and $1350, showing some potential emigrants expect the upside of earnings in New Zealand to be quite high. However, the proportion expecting this still seems too low relative to the realized data: 13 percent of potential emigrants expect to have a one in ten chance of having incomes above $800 if they work, giving a predicted 1.3 percent of individuals with incomes above this level at any given time.
However, in practice we observe 3 out of the 48 immigrant workers (6 percent) having wage income above $800 in New Zealand. The small sample sizes make such comparisons suggestive only, but they at least do not show evidence of overestimation of incomes, even at the very top of the distribution.
Unconditional Earnings
The unconditional distribution of expected earnings can then be obtained by combining the conditional earnings distribution with data on the expected probability of being employed. Since the income from work is zero if the individual is not working, we have for work income y:
where z i = 1 indicates that individual i is employed in New Zealand and φ i is i's information set. Combining the elicited expectations about the probability of employment given in Figure 2 with the conditional earnings distributions in Table 3 we obtain the unconditional earnings distributions. 
Do expectations help predict actual decisions?
The importance of the finding that potential emigrants underestimate incomes to be earned abroad depends in part on whether or not these expectations play a role in the decision to migrate. Classic theories of migration, such as Sjaastad (1962) and Harris and Todaro (1970) predict that expectations of incomes and employment abroad should matter. To examine whether expectations help predict actual decisions in our data, we compare the unconditional income expectations of ballot losers to those of individuals who did not apply for the Pacific Access Category. Column 1 of Table 5 shows that the median expected income is positively and significantly associated with the decision to apply for this migration category. Furthermore, this continues to be true after controlling for an individual's pre-application income and employment status. Expecting $100 more income after migrating is associated with a 10 percentage point increase in the likelihood of applying for migration. Thus, although our sample is relatively small, there is evidence that these expectations do predict economic behavior.
What explains the underestimation of income?
The above results show that Tongan would-be emigrants substantially underestimate the incomes they could earn in New Zealand. We now explore several explanations for these results, guided by the anthropological literature, discussions with our survey team, and our knowledge of the PAC procedure.
Poor expectations in general?
A first explanation for the underestimation of employment and income possibilities in New Zealand is that the questions were not well understood by the survey participants.
Or even if the questions are understood, individuals may be poor at forming expectations even about events for which they have more direct experience. To check against this, we asked the immigrants in New Zealand analogous questions as to their percent chance of 18 being employed, and to the income earned, if they were working in Tonga at the time of the survey. Since all are recent emigrants from Tonga, and most were working there, one should expect them to have reasonably accurate expectations. Tonga to their own previous experiences and to the experiences of the group of PAC ballot losers. For employment, the mean and median expected chances of working are 68 percent and 80 percent. This compares well to both their own prior employment rate (80%) and to the current employment rate of ballot losers (73%). When we look at males and females separately, we find that the mean expected percent chance of employment expressed by males is less than that of females, despite males having higher past employment rates. Nevertheless, the median expected percent chance of being employed for males is 80 percent, close to the actual prior rate of 83 percent.
When we consider conditional income expectations, we find that the expectations again seem fairly accurate when comparing to income prior to emigration. The mean of the mean expected earnings is 158 pa'anga, compared to a mean prior income of 154 pa'anga and a mean income among the ballot losers of 189 pa'anga. So the immigrants may not incorporate wage growth and inflation that have occurred since they left Tonga, but otherwise express expectations very close to their own experiences.
Very lucky immigrants?
A second explanation for the difference between subjective expectations and the realized outcomes of immigrants is that the immigrants all happened to receive very high draws from their subjective earnings distributions. To see how lucky immigrants would have had to have been for this to explain the difference, we draw an income from the estimated subjective conditional earnings distributions for each would-be emigrant, and use this to construct an estimate of the mean expected earnings among the would-be emigrants. We do this 10,000 times. In only 2 out of these 10,000 draws do we obtain a subjective mean equal to or greater than the actual mean conditional income for immigrants of $564.
Moreover, we get a subjective mean no more than 10 percent below the actual mean in only 10 out of the 10,000 draws, and a subjective mean no more than 20 percent below the actual mean in only 33 out of the 10,000 draws. Therefore it appears extremely unlikely that the large gap between expected and actual earnings can be attributed to the immigrants all receiving very good draws from their subjective earnings distributions. 
Comparison to the wrong reference group
Our survey allows us to compare the expectations of PAC ballot losers to the realized outcomes of PAC ballot winners at the same point in time. However, although we have complete information on how PAC ballot winners fare in New Zealand, it appears unlikely that individuals in Tonga do. A third potential explanation for the understated 10 Of course these calculations assume that draws from the subjective distributions are independent across individuals. In practice all individuals could receive a common positive shock. However, consider the very extreme case of perfectly correlated draws, so that if one individual draws from the 95 th percentile of his or her subjective distribution, all other would-be emigrants also draw from this percentile of their distributions. Even in the case, the probability of getting a mean subjective income of $564 or higher is only 0.067. employment probabilities and expected income is therefore that it arises from forming expectations on the basis of information coming from the wrong reference group. We consider two possible likely reference groups. The first is that PAC ballot losers have received some information about how the winners are doing, but have only heard about the experiences of individuals whose initial job offers fell through. The second is that PAC ballot losers base their expectations on the experiences of earlier cohorts of migrants.
Feedback from migrants whose job offers fell through?
The Pacific Access Category requires individuals with successful ballots to obtain a job offer before immigrating to New Zealand. The job offer must be for "ongoing and sustainable employment" and should be a full-time job which pays salary or wages (not commission or self-employment) and which complies with employment law in New Zealand. Despite having a job offer, our survey found that only 39 percent of the Tongan immigrants coming through the PAC during our sample period actually worked in the job that they had the offer for upon arriving in New Zealand. Amongst those not taking up the job offer, 68 percent found that the job was no longer available upon moving to New Zealand, due in large part to the time elapsing between filing their residence application, having it approved, and actually moving to New Zealand.
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As a result of this, a potential explanation for the low income expectations is that potential emigrants may have heard from friends and relatives that job offers would disappear by the time of immigration, leading new immigrants to have to search for new jobs and to take up jobs which are lower paid. Alternatively, even if information is available from both those taking up their initial jobs and those not doing so, the psychological literature suggests individuals may place disproportionate weight on negative outcomes compared to positive.
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The second row of Table 3 shows that although the income earned by immigrants not taking up their initial job offer is lower than the average immigrant income, it is still much higher than the expected income. The mean and median work income of immigrants who did not start work in the job for which they had their initial job offer is $520. The mean of the mean expected income ($337) is still only 65 percent of this. 13 We can test for possible information flow from PAC migrants to ballot losers using GPS coordinates collected on the locations in Tonga of houses of ballot losers and of the houses where migrants lived before migrating (and where some family member of the migrant is likely to remain). We use this to measure the distance of PAC ballot losers from the closest emigrant who didn't take up their initial job offer, and the proportion of PAC emigrants who didn't take up their initial job offer within a 6km radius of the house of the ballot loser. The first two columns of Table 7 show no significant effect of distance to PAC emigrants on conditional income expectations, with the signs of the coefficients showing, if anything, higher expected incomes for ballot losers living closer to those who didn't take up their initial job offer.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 then consider the effect on expectations about being employed if they migrate to New Zealand. Here we do find significant effects of distance.
Ballot losers who live closer to any PAC migrants who didn't take up their initial job offer expect lower likelihoods of being employed in New Zealand. Column 4 shows the size of the effect to be reasonably large. Individuals for which all PAC migrants within a 6 kilometer radius did not take up the initial job offer say they have a 19.6 percentage point lower likelihood of being employed. The constant term is 63%, and 65% if no controls other than the proportion of emigrants within 6km not taking up their initial job offer are used. Both of these are lower than the actual employment rate of 75% experienced by migrants in New Zealand, suggesting that feedback from migrants with bad experiences explains some, but not all of the low employment expectations. Overall, these results therefore suggest that proximity to the houses of migrants who did not take up their initial job offer lowers expectations about employment in New Zealand, but has no sizeable or significant effect on expected incomes conditional on working.
Basing expectations on earlier cohorts
Potential migrants may also base their expectations on the experiences of earlier cohorts 
Psychological Effects of Losing the Ballot Draw?
We asked the expectations questions at a time when individuals already knew whether or not their name had been drawn in the ballot. A fourth possibility for the understated expectations is that ballot losers attempt to make themselves feel better about losing in the ballot by downplaying the employment and income possibilities abroad. The fact that individuals can apply again for the PAC ballot the next year may reduce such an effect, but it may still be present. To examine this possibility, we consider also the expectations of the third group in our sample: individuals whose name was drawn in the ballot, but who had not yet migrated. These individuals were typically in the process of trying to find job offers or waiting for their applications to be processed, and the majority of them migrated after our survey. 
Extended Family trying to Moderate Remittance Demands?
The Tongan-born population in New Zealand was 17,682 by the time of the 2001 Census, compared to a population in Tonga of just over 100,000. As a result, many Tongans know someone in New Zealand, who may be a source of information about job opportunities.
Those applying to move to New Zealand under the PAC have more relatives in New Zealand than those not applying (McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 2006 Extended family such as uncles, aunts and cousins are an important source of remittances, with 43 percent of all remittances coming from extended family (McKenzie, 2006) . However, the remittance demands from extended family are seen by many as a burden on migrants. Based on her study of Tongan migrants in Australia, anthropologist Helen Lee writes that "these young people often argue that it is important to meet the needs of the immediate family before others, and while they uphold the importance of respect and of ties to the extended family, many believe that obligations to extended family create unwarranted demands on families already struggling to make ends meet". Lee (2003, p155) One mechanism that immigrants might use to try and mitigate the pressure to remit to extended family, or to at least reduce the level of remittances sought, might be to claim that they are earning less than they actually are. If this is the case, conditional on the total immigrant network that potential emigrants have in New Zealand, we should expect them to have lower expectations of income if this network includes extended family. dummy variable for whether or not the individual had been to New Zealand before the PAC ballot, and the total immigrant network, measured as the number of different types of relatives an individual has in New Zealand. 16 Columns 1 and 2 then include dummy variables for having an immigrant uncle/aunt and immigrant cousin respectively. We see that these are significantly negatively associated with lower income expectations in New Zealand. Columns 3, 4 and 5 show that in contrast, immigrant siblings and immigrant parents are positively associated with income expectations. Column 6 then enters both of the extended family indicators, uncle/aunt and cousin. While neither is individually significant, they are both negative, and strongly jointly significant (p-value=0.006). Table 9 carries out the analogous regressions for the percent chance of being employed in New Zealand. In contrast to the conditional income regressions, we do not see significant or sizeable associations with the presence of immediate or extended family in New
Zealand. Employment status of migrants is likely to be something more verifiable than earnings (other community members abroad will likely observe whether or not a migrant is working, but not their income). Thus if extended family are trying to moderate remittance demands, it seems plausible that they would be able to do so more readily through less accurate information on income earned, than through misreporting their employment status.
These results thus show that having extended family in New Zealand lowers expected earnings, conditional on total family network size. This might be entirely rational if extended family members are less useful than immediate family members in helping new immigrants find good jobs in New Zealand. In column 1 of Table 10 we therefore reestimate the last column of Table 8 , but this time for actual income earned by PAC immigrants in New Zealand. We use the coefficients from this equation to predict what the PAC ballot losers would earn in New Zealand. We take the difference between this predicted amount and their mean expected amount as a measure of the degree of underestimation of income.
Column 3 of Table 10 then examines the correlates of the degree of underestimation.
Having an immigrant uncle or aunt, or an immigrant cousin in one's migrant network is strongly associated with underestimating the income that can be earned in New Zealand.
We also see that males tend to underestimate income by more than females, and that those with more years of education are less likely to underestimate income.
One concern with these results is that the predicted income is based on a sample size of only 48 principal applicants working in New Zealand. A particular concern is that the coefficient on years of education is negative in equation (1), and very imprecise. This is the result of small sample size and the influence of a couple of individuals who are working while attending tertiary institutions. Hourly wages have a positive and insignificant relationship with years of schooling for the same sample. Therefore, in column 2 of Table 10 we reestimate the earnings equation for the full sample of 74 workers amongst the PAC immigrant households. This leads to a positive coefficient on years of education. Column 4 uses the predicted income from column 2. We again find that potential emigrants with cousins in New Zealand and males are more likely to underestimate income, while those with more education do less underestimation. Having an uncle or aunt in New Zealand is now negative and insignificant, although it is positive and insignificant if we omit cousin from this equation.
Comparing Column 2 of Table 10 to column 6 of Table 8 also shows these differences.
Potential emigrants get the signs right on most variables: they expect wages to rise with their incomes in Tonga, years of education, age, previous experience in New Zealand, and total migrant network. However, males and those with cousins in New Zealand expect to earn less, whereas these characteristics are associated with immigrants earning more in New Zealand. In Column 5 of Table 10 , we examine the interaction between gender and having a cousin in New Zealand. This interaction is negative and insignificant. Therefore females are just as affected by having cousins in New Zealand as males, if not more so. Table 6 shows that male and female immigrants have very similar expectations of the wages that they would earn if they were working in Tonga. Mean expected wages are 158 pa'anga for males and 157 pa'anga for females. These are close to the mean prior incomes of 146 pa'anga for males and 172 pa'anga for females. Among our sample of unsuccessful ballots, we also find that females have higher mean incomes than males, although the difference is not significant.
No male wage premium in Tonga?
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In Table 11 , we explore the differences in work income between male and female workers in Tonga after controlling for years of education, age, and marital status.
Restricting ourselves only to principal applicants for the Pacific Access Category, we see males having a positive and insignificant wage premium for the prior income of immigrants in New Zealand, and a negative and insignificant wage premium for the current income of unsuccessful ballots. We then look to broader samples of workers in Tonga. Column 3 shows that for all Tongan wage workers in our survey, the male dummy is negative, small, and statistically insignificant, while Column 4 shows a small positive and insignificant coefficient using the Tongan Labor Force survey. It therefore appears that there is no male wage premium in Tonga. We can not reject that male and female workers of the same age and education earn the same amount.
Tongan workers moving to New Zealand therefore face quite a different wage distribution than they do in Tonga. In particular, columns 5 and 6 of Table 11 show that male immigrants under the PAC earn significantly more than female immigrants. Male principal applicants earn $163 more per week on average than female principal applicants. Recall that the degree of male underestimation of income in New Zealand relative to females was $165-187 in Table 10 . Therefore almost all of the male difference in underestimating earnings in New Zealand can be accounted for by the male wage premium in New Zealand. Looking more broadly at all Pacific Island immigrants in New
Zealand, column 7 also shows a substantial male wage premium, similar in size to that obtained from our sample in column 6.
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The male wage premium for Tongan immigrants in New Zealand appears to result from differences in occupation among male and female migrants. Typical jobs for the male immigrant workers in our survey include builder, welder, construction worker, carpenter, technician, and factory worker. Typical jobs for female immigrants include cleaner, sales assistant, and grocery packer. In contrast, although some of immigrants worked in similar positions in Tonga, both men and women also worked in more white-collar jobs, such as teaching, banking services, and as government employees.
Comparing explanations
We have found that potential emigrants tend to underestimate both their likelihood of working and the income they can earn when working in New Zealand. The low expectations of employment appear to be driven in part by potential migrants overweighting the experiences of migrants who were unable to take up their initial job offer, and may also be due to potential migrants basing expectations too much on the experiences of earlier cohorts who migrated when unemployment rates for Tongans in New Zealand were much higher.
The underestimation of income appears to result in large part from the presence of extended family members such as cousins, uncles and aunts in the information network of potential migrants. These cousins, aunts and uncles appear to be offsetting the pressure to send remittances to extended family by downplaying their earnings in New Zealand. The tendency of males to underestimate income may be due to the fact that there is a large 31 gender gap in earnings in New Zealand, but not in Tonga. However, it is not clear why knowledge of this gender gap has not passed back to potential emigrants in Tonga.
Conclusions
We have combined a natural experiment on emigration with survey data on would-be emigrant's expectations about employment and incomes in the migration destination.
Contrary to anecdotal stories which raise fears of over-optimistic expectations, we find striking evidence that emigrants tend to underestimate the employment likelihood and the income they can earn abroad. The degree of underestimation appears to be in due to potential migrants placing excess weight on negative employment experiences of a few migrants, to extended family lowering remittance pressure, and to changes in the male wage premium between Tonga and New Zealand. They suggest that more accurate information about earnings opportunities abroad may actually increase migration pressure.
More broadly, our work demonstrates the feasibility of asking probabilistic expectations questions to individuals in developing countries, even in cases in which the event for which expectations are elicited is not one for which the individual has direct prior experience. Since individual decisions are driven by their subjective expectations, the large gap we find between realized outcomes for immigrants and expected outcomes for comparable would-be emigrants suggests that inference based on realized outcomes alone may be very misleading. 
